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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and Gregory R. Miller*
This survey period1 saw domestic relations law continue to evolve
through new legislation and new case law. The 2006 Georgia legislature
made dramatic changes to the child support calculations that took effect
in 2007. The 2007 Georgia legislature has turned its focus to child
custody issues, including passing laws requiring parenting plans in
custody, allowing attorney fee awards, and allowing for direct appeals in
child custody cases. The Georgia Supreme Court continued to accept
nonfrivolous appeals in divorce cases, and as a result, the appellate
courts have been able to give guidance to those interested in domestic
relations law.
I.

DIVORCE: PROCEDURE

The Georgia Supreme Court decided a variety of cases involving
procedural issues in family law cases. In Hammack v. Hammack,2 the
supreme court affirmed the entry of a divorce decree prior to the
expiration of forty-five days from the filing of the acknowledgment of
service.' The husband filed for divorce in January 2005. The .wife
signed an acknowledgment of service on March 17, 2005; however, the
husband did not actually file the document until April 29, 2005. The
wife served the husband with an answer on June 13, 2005, but the
husband then informed the wife that the trial court had entered a decree
*
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1. This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2006 to May 31, 2007.
2. 281 Ga. 202, 635 S.E.2d 752 (2006).
3. Id. at 202-03, 635 S.E.2d at 752-53.
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on June 6, 2005. 4 The trial court declined to set aside the decree under
Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule ("U.S.C.R.") 24.6 (B), 5 finding that
the decree was entered more than forty-six days after service was
perfected.6
7
The supreme court determined that the Georgia Civil Practice Act
allows for the entry of divorce decrees at any time more than thirty days
after service is perfected.' Where U.S.C.R. 24.6 (B) requires parties to
wait until after forty-five days have lapsed in unanswered divorce
cases, 9 the rule conflicts with statutory law, and the statutes must
govern.10
Certain defenses must be raised in the initial pleadings; however,
reconciliation is not one of them. 1 When a divorce is sought on the
grounds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, reconciliation is a
defense to the pending action, but it is not a ground to have a decree set
aside.12 In McCoy v. McCoy, 3 the parties resumed cohabitation and
sexual relations while the trial court had taken the divorce case under
advisement. During the period of cohabitation, the husband continued
to request the trial court to enter a decree; however, the husband did not
inform the trial court of the parties' cohabitation. 4 The supreme court
held that the failure to raise the defense prior to the entry of the
judgment amounted to a waiver.' 5
In Howington v. Howington,"6 the supreme court also held that a
7
party's inaction constituted a waiver."
The parties had been separated
for six years when the wife filed for divorce in 1997 in DeKalb County,

4. Id. at 202, 635 S.E.2d at 752.
5. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 24.6(B).
6. Hammack, 281 Ga. at 202, 635 S.E.2d at 752-53. The trial court appeared to have
determined that service was perfected on the date that the acknowledgment of service was
signed; however, U.S.C.R. 24.6(A) indicates that the date the acknowledgment is actually
filed is the relevant date. Id.; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 24.6(A).
7. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -133 (2007).
8. Hammack, 281 Ga. at 203, 635 S.E.2d at 753 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-12(a), -40(a)
(2006)).
9. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 24.6(B). Rule 24.6(A) allows for judgments to be entered
after more than 30 days have expired when the parties have given written consent for the
trial court to do so. Id.
10. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 1; Russell v. Russell, 257 Ga. 177, 177, 356 S.E.2d 884, 885
(1987).
11. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b).
12. Southworth v. Southworth, 265 Ga. 671, 672-73, 461 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1995).
13. 281 Ga. 604, 642 S.E.2d 18 (2007).
14. Id. at 604-05, 642 S.E.2d at 19.
15. Id. at 606, 642 S.E.2d at 20.
16. 281 Ga. 242, 637 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
17. Id. at 244, 637 S.E.2d at 390-91.
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where she resided. Even though the husband resided in North Carolina,
the wife served the complaint on the husband's adult son, a resident of
Fulton County. When the husband did not respond to the complaint, the
trial court entered a divorce decree, which awarded the wife fifty percent
of the husband's pension benefits. Over six years later, the husband
filed a motion to set aside the decree based on lack of service, which the
trial court granted in December 2004. Despite the decree being set
aside, the wife continued to receive one-half of the husband's pension
benefits.
The husband filed a counterclaim, and the trial court
conducted a new trial. At the trial, the husband requested the court to
order the wife to pay him back for the pension payments she had
received since the original divorce decree was set aside. Although the
husband's counterclaim did not contain his request, the wife allowed the
issue to be litigated at trial without objection."8 Therefore, the supreme
court held that the wife waived her right to complain.'" "'When issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
' ' 20
pleadings.
the
in

II.

ALIMONY

The Georgia Supreme Court considered the propriety of an alimony
award in Rieffel v.Rieffel. 2' In Rieffel the husband challenged the trial
court's award of alimony as excessive.22 Unlike with child support,

there are no mathematical guidelines to control the amount of alimony
awarded to a spouse. 24 Georgia law does, however, provide a list of
factors that the finder of fact "shall" consider in determining the amount
of alimony.25 In making its alimony award to Mrs. Rieffel, the trial

court specifically referenced several of these factors, including the
duration of their twenty-seven year marriage, the wife's absence from
the workforce to raise the parties' six children, and the difficulty the wife

will have in reentering the labor force after such a lengthy absence.26
Where the record shows that the trial court had evidence of the parties'

18. Id. at 242-44, 637 S.E.2d at 389-90.
19. Id. at 244, 637 S.E.2d at 391.
20. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 390 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(b)).
21. 281 Ga. 891, 644 S.E.2d 140 (2007).
22. Id. at 891, 644 S.E.2d at 141.
23. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
24. Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552, 615 S.E.2d 510, 511 (2005) (citing Worrell v.
Worrell, 242 Ga. 44, 47, 247 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1978)).
25. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(a) (2004).
26. Rieffel, 281 Ga. at 892-93, 644 S.E.2d at 142.
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financial position and the required factors in Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 19-6-5,27 the appellate court will not
disturb the wide discretion given to the finder of fact.2 s
III.

CHILD CUSTODY

The Georgia Supreme Court accepted two appeals in which each of the
fathers alleged that the trial court erred in awarding the mother
physical custody of the parties' children in lieu of joint custody.29 In
Cook v. Cook,3" the trial court was presented with evidence that showed
both parties to be fit parents. 1 Trial courts are authorized to award
joint physical or joint legal custody. 3 2 Georgia appellate courts have
held that when both parties are fit and equally capable of caring for the
child, it is error not to consider joint custody as an option.33 A trial
court, however, is not required to order joint physical custody.34 The
record showed that the trial court did consider joint custody; however,
the trial court determined that joint physical custody was not in the
child's best interests due to the parties' lack of communication. 35 The
supreme court "will not interfere with the decision of the trial court to
award custody of a child to one fit and proper parent over another,
unless the trial court abused its broad discretion." 3' The supreme court
reached an identical holding in Jones v. Smith, where the court
awarded the mother physical custody.3 8 The father's appeal did not
include a trial transcript; therefore, the appellate court was required to
presume that the evidence supported the trial court's decision. 9

27. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5 (2004).
28. Rieffel, 281 Ga. at 892-93, 644 S.E.2d at 142.
29. Cook v. Cook, 280 Ga. 768, 632 S.E.2d 664 (2006); Jones v. Smith, 280 Ga. 872, 632
S.E.2d 663 (2006).
30. 280 Ga. 768, 632 S.E.2d 664 (2006).
31. Id. at 768, 632 S.E.2d at 665.
32. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(5) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Effective January 1, 2008, O.C.G.A.
section 19-9-3 will be amended so that the current subsection (a)(5) will be found at
O.C.G.A. section 19-9-3(a)(1) (Supp. 2007).
33. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 265 Ga. 465, 465, 458 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1995); see also Steed
v. Deal, 225 Ga. App. 35, 35, 482 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1997); Graham v. Holmes, 218 Ga. App.
796, 798, 463 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1995).
34. Baldwin, 265 Ga. at 465, 458 S.E.2d at 127.
35. Cook, 280 Ga. at 768, 632 S.E.2d at 665.
36. Id. (citing Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 Ga. 548, 549, 533 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (2000)).
37. 280 Ga. 872, 632 S.E.2d 663 (2006).
38. Id. at 872, 632 S.E.2d at 663-64.
39. Id.
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IV.

CHILD CUSTODY:

NON-PARENTS

Cases between parents and non-parents continued to reach the
appellate courts. Under O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b.1), 40 the court may
award custody to a close relative 41 of the children if clear and convincing evidence shows that parental custody would harm the children
physically or emotionally and that custody by the non-parent would
promote the children's health, welfare, and happiness.42 The statute,
however, does not include a step-parent as a relative.43
In Veal v. Veal," the husband and wife married the month after the
wife gave birth to another man's child. Although the husband signed the
child's birth certificate and treated the child as his own, the husband did
not formally adopt the child. When the husband and wife divorced, the
decree was silent with respect to the child born before the parties'
marriage. The husband successfully moved to set aside the decree for
failing to address the custody of the child. 4' The supreme court
reversed, holding that the husband's failure to adopt the child left him
without standing to seek custody of the child. 4' Because the husband
was not the child's biological parent, the legitimation statute47 could
not provide any relief to the husband.48
In Georgia, courts may grant visitation only to grandparents. 49 The
grant of visitation to grandparents is conditioned on a finding that (1)
the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless the court
grants such visitation and (2) such visitation would serve the best
interests of the child.5 ° In Luke v. Luke,"' the court of appeals held
that the paternal grandfather's testimony alone sufficed to show that the
children would be harmed if he were not granted visitation rights.5 2

40. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
41. Id. Under O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b.1), close relatives are limited to grandparent,
great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent. Id.
42. Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 598-99, 544 S.E.2d 99, 107-08 (2001).
43. See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).
44. 281 Ga. 128, 636 S.E.2d 527 (2006).
45. Id. at 128, 130, 636 S.E.2d at 528, 530.
46. Id.
47. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
48. Veal, 281 Ga. at 128-29, 636 S.E.2d at 529.
49. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2004).
50. Id. § 19-7-3(c).
51. 280 Ga. App. 607, 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006).
52. Id. at 611-12, 634 S.E.2d at 443-44. But cf. Hunter v. Carter, 226 Ga. App. 251, 485
S.E.2d 827 (1997) (holding there was no evidence that the child would be harmed when the
grandparents had not seen the child in two years).
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MODIFICATION

Both the appellate courts and the legislature have contributed to
development of the law pertaining to child custody modifications. In
Upchurch v. Smith,5 3 the Georgia Supreme Court considered a venue
case of first impression.5 4 The parties were divorced in Fulton County,
where the court awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of
the parties' minor children with the mother designated as the primary
physical custodian. The father filed a complaint to modify custody in
Cobb County, where the mother had relocated; however, the trial court
denied the petition. The mother later relocated to California, and the
father filed a new complaint to modify custody in Fulton County. The
case was transferred to Cobb County, where the new complaint was
denied.5" The supreme court affirmed the change of venue.56 Even
though the trial court in Cobb County declined to modify the Fulton
County decree, the supreme court held that the Cobb County court had
rendered a decision on the merits in conformity with the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.57 Therefore, Cobb County
retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction.58
In Moses v. King,5 9 the supreme court held that parties seeking a
custody modification must not only show a change of conditions, but they
must also show a change of conditions substantially affecting the
interests and welfare of the children involved.6" The father brought his
action wherein he made various allegations against the mother; however,
the trial court based its modification solely on the mother's current
cohabitation in a meretricious relationship with another woman and the
mother's several previous relationships with women who were allowed
to spend the night in the mother's residence while the child was present.
The trial court emphasized that it routinely applied the same rule to
heterosexual parents who engage in meretricious relationships as it
applied in the instant case. As a result, the court indicated that it would
enter an order awarding custody to the father and requiring the mother
to pay child support. The trial court granted the mother's motion for a
new trial to the extent that the child would be allowed to testify on the

53. 281 Ga. 28, 635 S.E.2d 710 (2006).
54. Id. at 29, 635 S.E.2d at 711.
55. Id. at 28-29, 635 S.E.2d at 710-11.
56. Id. at 29, 635 S.E.2d at 711.
57. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -104 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
58. Upchurch, 281 Ga. at 29, 635 S.E.2d at 711; see O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62.
59. 281 Ga. App. 687, 637 S.E.2d 97 (2006).
60. Id. at 692, 637 S.E.2d at 101.
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record."' The twelve-year-old child testified that she would like to
divide her time equally between her parents. The trial court entered a
new written order dividing the child's time with each parent equally and
eliminating any obligation of the parties to pay child support to the
other parent.6 2 The order did not include any provision restricting the
mother from having guests in the presence of the child.63
The mother appealed the modification order, arguing that no evidence
supported the trial court's rationale that the mother's relationships, past
or current, had any negative impact on the child. In fact, the evidence
indicated that the child loved the mother's partner, performed well in
school, and had close relationships with her extended family.64 Relying
on precedent, the supreme court held that the lack of any evidence
showing that the material change resulted in any substantial effect on
the child required reversal of the modification order.6"
The supreme court did not address whether the twelve-year-old child's
testimony amounted to an election pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 19-9166 and O.C.G.A. section 19-9-3, 7 but the election of a child under the
age of fourteen cannot be the sole basis of a modification action." The
court of appeals, however, ruled in a later case that such an election
from a fourteen-year-old child would not be valid."
In Sharpe v. Perkins, ° the fourteen-year-old minor child signed an
election requesting that her parents share joint legal and physical
custody of her and that she be allowed to divide her time equally
between her parents.7
The trial court found that the election was
invalid, and the court of appeals agreed.72 O.C.G.A. sections 19-9-1 and
19-9-3 allow for children age fourteen or older to elect which parent the

61. Id. at 688-89, 637 S.E.2d at 99. The trial court had interviewed the parties' child
off the record at the initial custody hearing. Id. at 689, 637 S.E.2d at 99.
62. Id. at 689, 637 S.E.2d at 99-100.
63. Id. at 692, 637 S.E.2d at 101.
64. Id. at 690-92, 637 S.E.2d at 100-01.
65. Id. at 692, 637 S.E.2d at 101; see Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 551
S.E.2d 721 (2001); Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 404 S.E.2d 276 (1991); Livesay v.
Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 379 S.E.2d 557 (1989).
66. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1 (2004).
67. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3 (2004).
68. Moses, 281 Ga. App. at 692, 637 S.E.2d at 101 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4.1)
(2004)).
69. Sharpe v. Perkins, 284 Ga. App. 376, 377, 644 S.E.2d 178, 180 (2007).
70. 284 Ga. App. 376, 644 S.E.2d 178 (2007).
71. Id. at 377, 644 S.E.2d at 180.
72. Id.
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child wants to have custody; the specific language does not provide that
the child can select both parents.73
The Georgia legislature was also concerned about children being able
to elect their custodial parents. Originally, the legislature amended
O.C.G.A. sections 19-9-1 and 19-9-3 to allow children over the age of
fourteen years to make an election concerning their custodial parent, and
the election was binding on the trial court unless the selected parent was
deemed unfit. 74
The legislature later added a provision allowing
children over the age of eleven years but under the age of fourteen years
to make custodial elections; trial courts had to consider such elections
but were not bound by them. 75 In 2007, however, the legislature
dramatically changed its course. 6 Effective January 1, 2008, the
elections of a child age fourteen or older will only be considered to be
"presumptive."77 To disregard the election, the trial court will only
have to find that the election would not be in the child's best interests,
a much easier standard to meet than having to find a parent unfit.7 8
Furthermore, the new statute gives the trial court wide discretion to
determine what weight it will give to an election of a child over the age
of eleven years but under the age of fourteen years.7 9
VI. CHILD CUSTODY: PARENTING PLAN
The 2007 legislature redrafted O.C.G.A. section 19_9_18o to require all
child custody orders after January 1, 2008 to incorporate a parenting
plan. 1 If the parties cannot agree on a consolidated parenting plan,
then each party must submit his or her own parenting plan on or before
the trial date. 2 If a party fails to submit a proposed parenting plan,
that party runs the risk of the trial court adopting the plan submitted
by the other parent.8 3
Unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, the parenting plan shall
include the following statements: (1) "[C]lose and continuing parent-child
relationship and continuity in the child's life will be in the child's best

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 377-78, 644 S.E.2d at 180-81 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4)-(5) (2004)).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-1(a)(3)(A), -3(a)(4) (2004).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-1(a)(3)(B), -3(a)(4.1) (2004).
See Ga. H.R. Bill 369, Reg. Sess. (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(5) (Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id. § 19-9-3(a)(6).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1 (Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id. § 19-9-1(c).
Id.
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interest;""4 (2) "[T]he child's needs will change and grow as the child
matures[,] and... the parents will make an effort to parent that takes
this issue into account so that future modifications to the parenting plan
are minimized;" 85 (3) "[A] parent with physical custody will make dayto-day decisions and emergency decisions while the child is residing with
such parent;" 86 and (4) "[B]oth parents will have access to all of the
child's records and information, including, but not limited to, education,
health, extracurricular activities, and religious communications."'8'
The parenting plan must also include the following information unless
the court orders otherwise: (1) a detailed schedule containing which
parent will have physical care of the child each day of the year; 8 (2) a
detailed schedule of each parent's parenting time for holidays, birthdays,
vacations, school breaks, and other special occasions;8 9 (3) transportation arrangements; 90 (4) the terms of supervision if any are required;9 1
(5) the terms of legal custody, including how to resolve any disputes
between the parties; 92 and (6) the terms of any restrictions placed on
either party's parenting time with the child or access to information
relating to the child.93
VII.

CHILD SUPPORT: GUIDELINES

The new income shares model of Georgia's Child Support Guidelines
went into effect beginning January 1, 2007. 9
Even though the
appellate cases decided during the survey period interpreted the old
guidelines, some of the opinions relate to issues that can and will arise
under the new guidelines.
In Sharpe v. Perkins," the court of appeals affirmed a child support
modification award which considered the noncustodial parent's income
from capital gains for the purposes of calculating the child support
obligation. 96 The pre-2007 Child Support Guidelines9 7 defined "gross

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. § 19-9-1(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(1)(C).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(D).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(E).
Id. § 19-9-1(b)(2)(F).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
284 Ga. App. 376, 644 S.E.2d 178 (2007).

96. Id. at 379, 644 S.E.2d at 182.
97.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2004) (amended 2007).
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income" as "100 percent of wage and salary income and other compensation for personal services, interest, dividends, net rental income, selfemployment income, and all other income, except need-based public
assistance." 8
The appellate court determined that the statutory
language "other income" encompassed capital gains from real estate
transactions.99 The new Child Support Guidelines expressly define
"income" to include capital gains.100
The supreme court considered whether the noncustodial parent had
waived his rights to modify child support." 1 In Jones v. Jones,"°2 the
parties had agreed that the father would pay twenty-eight percent of his
gross income as child support but not less than $1,657.86 per month.
The agreement also required the father to pay spousal support to the
mother.103 The agreement also contained a provision that the parties
"'hereby waive their statutory right to future modifications,
up or down,
04
of the alimony payments provided for herein.' 1
The father sought to modify the child support provisions in 2002;
however, the trial court declined to modify the support provisions in its
2004 decision. The father lost his job and filed a motion for reconsideration during the same term of court. The trial court granted the motion
and after a new hearing changed the child support to $1,562.50 per
0 6
month.'
The supreme court,"
however, held that the term "alimony" has historically included both support for children and support for
spouses." 7 Therefore, where parties waive their rights to modify
alimony payments, the waiver applies to both spousal support and child
support unless expressly stated otherwise. 1°'

98. Id.
99. Sharpe, 284 Ga. App. at 379, 644 S.E.2d at 181-82.
100. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(xii) (Supp. 2007).
101. Jones v. Jones, 280 Ga. 712, 632 S.E.2d 121 (2006).
102. 280 Ga. 712, 632 S.E.2d 121 (2006).
103. Id. at 712-13, 632 S.E.2d at 122-23.
104. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
105. Id. at 713-14, 632 S.E.2d at 123.
106. Justice Carol W. Hunstein wrote the plurality opinion. Id. at 712, 632 S.E.2d at
122. Justices P. Harris Hines and Robert Benham dissented. Id. at 717, 632 S.E.2d at 126
(Hines, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 716, 632 S.E.2d at 125 (majority opinion); see O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-4, -17, -18(a),
-22, -27 (2004); Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706 (1985); Eskew v. Eskew, 199
Ga. 513, 34 S.E.2d 697 (1945); Rochester v. Rochester, 124 Ga. 993, 53 S.E. 399 (1906).
108. Jones, 280 Ga. at 716-17, 632 S.E.2d at 125; cf. Beard v. Beard, 250 Ga. 449, 449,
298 S.E.2d 495, 495 (1983) (waiver language expressly limited to "alimony for wife").
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EQUITABLE DIVISION

The Georgia Supreme Court was presented with several cases in which
the trial court entered orders that gave little rationale behind the
division of marital property. In two separate cases, the supreme court
held that the success of a party's appeal may be contingent upon
whether it requested findings of fact at the trial level.' °9 In Crowder
v. Crowder,"' the trial court heard conflicting evidence regarding
whether the appreciation on certain assets was marital or nonmarital."' The trial court entered a judgment dividing the assets between
the parties, but it did not distinguish whether it awarded the appreciation on the assets to a party as part of the separate asset or as part of
the equitable division of marital property." 2 A trial court is not
required to make findings of fact unless requested to do so by either
party." 3 The Georgia Supreme court stated,
Inasmuch as the issues on appeal depend upon the factual determinations made by the trial court as fact-finder and neither party asked the
trial court to make factual findings, [the appellate courts] are unable

to conclude that the trial court's equitable distribution of marital
114
property was improper as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.
A month later, the supreme court reached an identical result in the
factually similar case of Mathis v. Mathis."'
In Stanley v. Stanley,"6 the supreme court was asked to address a
case where the trial court entered a generic form divorce decree that
11 7 did
not award either party an equitable division of marital property.
"[T]itle to property, including jointly owned property, not described in
the verdict and judgment is unaffected by the divorce decree and
remains titled in the name of the owner or owners before the decree
was entered. Any future issues as to the management, division or
disposal of [any] jointly owned property should be treated as they arise,

109.
865, 642
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Crowder v. Crowder, 281 Ga. 656, 642 S.E.2d 97 (2007); Mathis v. Mathis, 281 Ga.
S.E.2d 832 (2007).
281 Ga. 656, 642 S.E.2d 97 (2007).
Id. at 656-57, 642 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 658, 642 S.E.2d at 99.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a) (2007).
Crowder, 281 Ga. at 658-59, 642 S.E.2d at 99.
281 Ga. 865, 642 S.E.2d 832 (2007).
281 Ga. 672, 642 S.E.2d 94 (2007).
Id. at 672, 642 S.E.2d at 95.
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without regard to the previous status of the parties as husband and
wife." 18
The supreme court held that such a disposition falls within the trial
court's broad discretion and in this case, it was not erroneous. 119
IX.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

For many years, domestic relations attorneys and other interested
parties have tried to restore the right to direct appeals. Currently, all
appeals of domestic relations cases must adhere to the discretionary
review process. 12 As a result, appellants must file an application for
discretionary review.'2 ' The movement for direct appeals began to
gather momentum when the supreme court unveiled its pilot project
wherein it agreed to grant all nonfrivolous applications for discretionary
The supreme court has
review in divorce and alimony cases.122
renewed the project each year since the project began. In 2007 the
legislature joined the movement by amending O.C.G.A. section 5-634,123 effective January 1, 2008, to include the right to direct appeals
in all cases involving child custody orders, modification of custody
1 24
orders, and contempt of court orders arising from custody orders.
X.

CONTEMPT

Although the Georgia Supreme Court's pilot project did not include
automatic acceptance of contempt cases, the supreme court did accept a
large number of applications for discretionary review of contempt cases.
In Jacob v. Koslow, 25 the supreme court clarified the venue rules for
a contempt proceeding.' 26 The parties were divorced in Fulton County;
however, both parties subsequently relocated to Cherokee County. The
husband
wife filed a petition in Cherokee County seeking to have the 12
held in contempt of the parties' Fulton County divorce decree. 1

118. Id. at 673-74, 642 S.E.2d at 96 (brackets in original) (quoting Cale v. Cale, 242 Ga.
600, 601, 250 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1978)).
119. Id. at 673, 642 S.E.2d at 95-96.
120. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2) (1995 & Supp. 2007).
121. Id. § 5-6-35(b).
122. See Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 587 S.E.2d 600 (2003).
123. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (1995 & Supp. 2007).
124. Id. § 5-6-34(a)(11) (Supp. 2007).
125. 282 Ga. 51, 644 S.E.2d 857 (2007).
126. Id. at 51-52, 644 S.E.2d at 857.
127. Id. at 51, 644 S.E.2d at 857.
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Generally, parties must file contempt petitions in the court of
rendition. 28 The appellate courts have made an exception where the
parties file the contempt petition in conjunction with a modification
129
action in a different county either as a second claim by the movant
3°
In either case, the courts
or as a counterclaim by the respondent.
have held that the filing of the modification action vested the new county
decree and warranted "a
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of1the
31
flexible approach to contempt jurisdiction."
In Jacob the trial court found that Cherokee County would have
jurisdiction over a modification case had one been filed; therefore, it
concluded that venue of a contempt case would be proper in Cherokee
County.'32 The supreme court disagreed. 133 While the trial court
correctly stated that Cherokee County would assume jurisdiction over a
modification action by virtue of both parties residing within that county,
the trial court erred in its finding that it could assume such jurisdiction
prior to a modification action actually being filed.'
In Gowins v. Gary,'35 the court of appeals held that a trial court had
the authority to enforce provisions in settlement agreements even when
136
the action was required to take place before the entry of the order.
The parties negotiated a child support amount for the father to pay
beginning July 2002. The agreement was not made an order of any
court until April 2005. In August 2006 the mother obtained a hearing
on her request to have the father held in contempt for nonpayment of
support.'3 7 The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to
enforce the agreement in a contempt case for the payments that accrued
prior to the entry of the April 2005 order. 31 Once parties reach an
agreement and incorporate it into a court order, the trial court has the
authority to enforce all of the terms contained therein. 3 9
In the majority of the cases in which the supreme court addressed
contempt issues, the court considered whether the trial court properly

128. Goodrum v. Goodrum, 202 Ga. 135, 135, 42 S.E.2d 450,451 (1947); Rockwood Int'l
Sys. Supply, Inc. v. Rader Cos., 255 Ga. App. 881, 882, 567 S.E.2d 104, 106 (2002).
129. E.g., Corbett v. Corbett, 236 Ga. App. 299, 300-01, 511 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1999).
130. E.g., Buckholts v. Buckholts, 251 Ga. 58, 60, 302 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1983).
131. Jacob, 282 Ga. at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 858.
132. Id. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 858.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 858.
135. 284 Ga. App. 370, 643 S.E.2d 836 (2007), cert. granted.
136. Id. at 372, 643 S.E.2d at 838.
137. Id. at 370, 643 S.E.2d at 837.
138. Id. at 372, 643 S.E.2d at 838.
139. Id.; see also Graves v. Graves, 239 Ga. 869, 869, 239 S.E.2d 35, 36-37 (1977).
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interpreted the provisions of the decree or improperly modified the
existing terms.
In Johnston v. Johnston,' the supreme court held that the trial
court properly exercised its authority to interpret the decree."' The
wife sought to have the husband held in contempt for failing to pay her
The parties differed
fifty percent of the value of the "marital home."'
43
The husband claimed that he
on how to define the term "home."'
owned the land prior to the marriage; therefore, he argued that the term
home only referred to the value of the mobile home that was on the land.
The wife argued that the term home encompassed the land as well. The
trial court agreed with the husband's definition and did not find him in
Because a trial court has the authority to interpret
contempt.'"
divorce decrees in the context of contempt cases 145 and because the
appellant did not include a transcript of the hearing in the record on
the trial court abused its
appeal, the supreme court could not hold that
46
discretion in interpreting the term home.
In Page v. Baylard,'4 ' the supreme court held that the trial court did
not properly interpret the terms of the decree. 4 ' The parties were
required to equally divide any medical expenses for their child that were
not covered by insurance. The agreement obligated the mother to
consult with the father prior to incurring any major non-emergency
medical expense. Due to the child's substance abuse and behavioral
problems, the mother, upon the advice of one of the child's psychological
counselors, enrolled the child in a long-term residential treatment
facility that included a high school curriculum and individual counseling.
Although the facility charged $2750 per month, the mother did not
consult with the father during the months in which she was selecting a
facility, and she did not consult with him for over a year after the child
had been placed in the facility.'49 The plurality opinion' held that
the language of the decree made consultation with the father a condition

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
Justice

281 Ga. 666, 641 S.E.2d 538 (2007).
Id. at 668, 641 S.E.2d at 541.
Id. at 666, 641 S.E.2d at 539.
Id. at 666-67, 641 S.E.2d at 540.
Id.
Millner v. Millner, 260 Ga. 495, 497, 397 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1990).
Johnston, 281 Ga. at 668, 641 S.E.2d at 540-41.
281 Ga. 586, 642 S.E.2d 14 (2007).
Id. at 587, 642 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 586-87, 642 S.E.2d at 15-16.
Justice Hugh Thompson wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 586, 642 S.E.2d at 15.
Harold Melton dissented. Id. at 588, 642 S.E.2d at 16 (Melton, J., dissenting).
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precedent for the father's obligation to share in the medical expense."'
Because the mother failed to consult with the father prior to incurring
1 52
the expenses, the trial court erred in holding the father in contempt.
The supreme court did determine that the trial courts went beyond
mere interpretation in a host of cases during the survey period. In
Norris v.Norris,53 the parties' agreement was silent about how many
semesters of the child's undergraduate education the father was
obligated to pay. The mother filed a contempt action when the father
stopped paying the college expenses. The trial court determined that a
reasonable duration would be eleven semesters.'54
The supreme
court 5 held that the terms were not ambiguous and did not require
interpretation.'
The parties agreed that the father would pay for the
expenses of a college education and only limited the amount to an
amount equivalent of attending the University of Georgia.5 7 The
court determined that if the parties had wanted additional limitations,
they could have negotiated those terms, but they did not.5 s The trial
court's imposition of a time limit substantively changed the decree and
required reversal.'59
In Roquemore v. Burgess,' the agreement required the wife to
quitclaim her interest in the marital home in favor of the husband. The
agreement further required the husband to pay the wife the sum of
$15,000 upon the sale of the home or earlier upon his election. The
husband was also required to maintain life insurance, covering the
$15,000 obligation, until he paid the amount in full. When nearly three
years had passed without payment, the wife filed a contempt action.
The trial court ordered the residence to be sold and set forth the terms
of the sale.' 6 ' The Georgia Supreme Court has stated, "While the trial
court has broad discretion to determine whether the decree has been
violated and has authority to interpret and clarify the decree, it does not

151. Id. at 587, 642 S.E.2d at 16 (majority opinion).
152. Id.
153. 281 Ga. 566, 642 S.E.2d 34 (2007).
154. Id. at 566-67, 642 S.E.2d at 35.
155. Justice Carol W. Hunstein wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 566, 642 S.E.2d at
35. Justice Harold Melton wrote a special concurrence. Id. at 568, 642 S.E.2d at 36
(Melton, J., concurring). Chief Justice Leah Sears and Justice Hugh Thompson dissented.
Id. at 569, 642 S.E.2d at 36 (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 567, 642 S.E.2d at 35 (majority opinion).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 281 Ga. 593, 642 S.E.2d 41 (2007).
161. Id. at 593-94, 642 S.E.2d at 42.
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have the power in a contempt proceeding to modify the terms of the
agreement or decree.""6 2 The parties' decree provided three means by
which the husband could satisfy the $15,000 obligation: (1) through his
own funds if he so elected, (2) through life insurance proceeds if he died,
or (3) through the proceeds of the sale of the house.'6 3 "The fact that
two of those sources are independent of any sale of the marital home
contradicts the assertion by [the wife] and the assumption by the trial
court that [the husband] was required by the.., decree to sell the house
and pay [the wife] from the proceeds."" 4
In Smith v. Smith,'65 the trial court entered a decree based on the
jury's verdict of alimony and property division. The husband filed a
motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The husband's
application for appeal was granted; however, the court later dismissed
it when the husband failed to pay the costs. When the husband failed
to divide the assets according to the judgment, the wife filed a contempt
166
action. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt.
The trial court found that the husband could not divide the individual
retirement account ("IRA") as required because he had previously
depleted the account; therefore, the trial court ordered payment of the
value of the IRA in "'an alternate form."" 7 The trial court found that
the husband could not transfer certain stocks because the stocks were
not owned by the parties or did not have any value; thus, the court
struck those provisions. The trial court found that the husband never
had the resources to satisfy a $291,000 lump sum award as required;
therefore, the court required the husband to pay the amount over a
period of time with interest. The trial court found that the $2000 award
of supplemental alimony was for the support of the parties' disabled
adult daughter and was unenforceable child support beyond the age of
majority. The trial court also struck a provision requiring the husband
to place certain stocks in trust for the minor child. Finally, the trial
court offset its award of attorney fees to the wife by an earlier
award. 6 ' The supreme court held that the trial court, in striking
provisions, reducing the fee award, and altering payments, substantially

162.
272 Ga.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Dohn v. Dohn, 276 Ga. 826, 828, 584 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) (citing Blair v. Blair,
94, 95, 527 S.E.2d 177, 178 (2000)).
Roquemore, 281 Ga. at 595, 642 S.E.2d at 43.
Id.
281 Ga. 204, 636 S.E.2d 519 (2006).
Id. at 204-05, 636 S.E.2d at 520-21.
Id. at 205, 636 S.E.2d at 521.
Id. at 205-06, 636 S.E.2d at 521.
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and improperly modified the decree in the context of a contempt
69
case. 1
XI.

ATTORNEY FEES

Although trial courts have broad discretion to award attorney fees in
divorce, alimony, or contempt cases ancillary to divorce or alimony
judgments, the appellate courts have continued to insist that the
evidence support the fee awards. Under O.C.G.A. section 19-6-2,170
trial courts must consider the financial circumstances of both parties in
determining awards of attorney fees.17' In Rieffel v. Rieffel, 72 the
supreme court upheld an award of $4000 to the wife when the trial court
considered evidence of the parties' respective financial conditions.' 73
In Anderson v. Svard,74 the supreme court reversed the award
because the record was devoid of evidence of the parties' financial
circumstances. 175
"As a general rule, Georgia law does not provide for the award of
attorney fees even to a prevailing party unless authorized by statute or
by contract.' 7 6 Where a trial court makes an award of attorney fees
sustainable on appeal, the statutory basis for the award must be
referenced in the order or be discernible from the record.1 77 In Webb
v. Watkins,'17 the court determined that the father was in contempt of
a paternity order requiring the payment of child support. 179 The order
and the record were silent regarding the basis for the award of attorney
fees; therefore, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for
further findings.""
During the survey period, no statutory basis existed for awarding
attorney fees in custody cases beyond divorce cases.'
In April 2007,

169. Id. at 206-07,636 S.E.2d at 522; see Collins v. Billow, 277 Ga. 604, 605, 592 S.E.2d
843, 845 (2004).
170. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2004).
171. Id. § 19-6-2(a)(1).
172. 281 Ga. 891, 644 S.E.2d 140 (2007).
173. Id. at 893, 644 S.E.2d at 142.
174. 282 Ga. 53, 644 S.E.2d 861 (2007).
175. Id. at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 861.
176. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822,824, 543 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2000) (citing Indus.
Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Waite, 268 Ga. 115, 116, 485 S.E.2d 792, 793 (1997)).
177. Wehner v. Parris, 258 Ga. App. 772, 773, 574 S.E.2d 921, 922-23 (2002).
178. 283 Ga. App. 385, 641 S.E.2d 611 (2007).
179. Id. at 385, 641 S.E.2d at 612.
180. Id. at 386, 641 S.E.2d at 613.
181. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

however, the Georgia legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 19-9-3 12
to allow trial courts to determine whether to award attorney fees and
other costs18 associated
with child custody cases, including guardian ad
3
litem fees.
XII.

CONCLUSION

This survey period has been a busy time for domestic relations law.
After several delays, the new child support guidelines went into effect,
dramatically changing the litigation of child support cases. The Georgia
legislature, however, did not stop there, and major changes to child
custody cases were passed and will go into effect in January 2008. The
appellate courts have continued their role of interpreting the laws and
giving guidance to domestic relations litigants and attorneys.

182.
183.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
Id. § 19-9-3(g) (Supp. 2007).

